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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
E. J. HUBER and
RALPH DUNKLEY,
Plaintiffs and Appellees,
Case
No. 69166

vs.
VICTOR NEWMAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
)

Petition for Rehearing
Appellant Victor Newman respectfully petitions the
Honorable Supreme Court for a rehearing of his appeal
from the district court judgment of $19,451.03 and for a
reversal of said judgment with directions for a new trial,
upon the ground that this Court in its opinion and judgment herein erred as follows :
1. In treating Benson v. Rozelle, 85 Utah 582 as overruled and displaced by Gibbs v. District Court, 86 Utah, 314,
whereas. in both the Gibbs case and this case the Court distinguished the Rozelle case and left' it in force within the
scope thereof.
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2. In treating the Gibbs case procedure as sustaining the judgment appealed from herein, whereas said judgment is reprobated thereby.
3. In holding the "Findings of Fact" by the Court
(rec. p. 83'-90) to be complete and responsive to all the
issues, and adequate to sustain the judgment appealed from,
whereas said findings do not respond to all the issues nor
suffice on their face to sustain the judgment complained
of.
4. In failing to observe and hold that the paper denominated as the report of the referee, in paragraphs 2,
5 et seq. of the court's findings of fact, was and is null,
void and of no effect whatever by reason of recitals on the
face thereof and on the face of the accompanying record,
showing that it was not the product or consumation of any
trial by the referee, judicially conducted according to law
in the presence of the parties or their attorneys of record,
or pursuant to any notice to said parties or attorneys of
the time or place at which a trial would be commenced;
that no such notice was ever given, and no such trial was
ever had; and no evidence under oath of any witness was
ever given in the presence of the parties or their attorneys,
or otherwise or at all, as required by the provisions of
Utah Annot. Code 1943, 104-27-6; by Utah Const. art. 1,
sec. 7, or by U. S. Const. 14th amendment section 1; or
U. S.· Const. 5th amendment. Thereby appellant was deprived of due process of law in the trial and adjudication
of the facts of this case, and the conclusions of law to be
drawn therefrom, and in the judgment that resulted there-from.
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5. In failing to observe and hold that the so-called
referee in so proceeding contrary to law was not in fact
or law a judicial tribunal nor functioning as such, and was
without jurisdiction or judicial power to act as a referee
or find or adjudicate the facts upon which the district
court could render or enter any judgment against appellant,
nor could the district court amend, add to, or adopt said
void report or findings. of the referee, in whole or in part.
6. In failing to observe and hold that, independently
of said void report of the referee there was not any evidence
whatever by oral testimony of any witness, or otherwise, or
at all, to support a finding of fact or conclusion of law
that appellant owed the appellees $19,451.03, or $13,386.37,
or any sum or amount whatever. There was no proof of
debits or credits in favor of or against either appellant or
appellees, in accounting, nor any evidence upon which a
balance could be struck or computed in favor of either party
to this. action against the other; nor any lawful finding or
adjudication of facts showing any such debits, credits or
balance upon which any judgment whatever could be lawfully rendered or entered against this appellant.
7. In resorting to the rule of decision in equity cases
upon conflicting evidence supported by Starnley v. Stanley,
97 Utah, 520, 94 Pac. 2d, 465, for the reason that there
is absolutely no evidence, conflicting or otherwise, showing any debits., credits or balance due either party hereto
against the other ; nor any adjudication or finding of facts
upon which a judgment for $19,451.03 or any other amount
can be supported.
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8. In holding, in effect, that any judgment, judicial
record, or other document that is void upon its face can be
validated or given effect by the failure or neglect of a
party to object thereto at any particular time or place; and
in failing to hold that such void record or document remains void and may be objected to and assailed at any and
all times and places, upon either direct or collateral attack,
by any person against whom the same may be offered or
asserted or sought to be enforced.
9. In affirming the judgment appealed from as against
appellant's objections Nos. 1 to 8 hereof.
10. In affirming said judgment contrary to the provisions of Utah Code, 1943, 69-1-35, and 69-1-37 and other
sections of said chapter requiring the payment of debts
before distribution to firm members.
11. In holding in effect that a trial court may dispense
with said statutory requirements, if it exact security or indemnity from the member who is plaintiff in accounting that
he will pay his contributive share of the firm debts which
the defendant member may thereafter be compelled to pay.
And that the court may, after ordering such security, dispense with the same, and give judgment for a share of the
gross earnings notwithstanding that plaintiff members
have failed to give such security or indemnity.
12. In affirming the judgment below for $19,451.03
whereas the same is unsupported by evidence or fact finding.
And for the several reasons shown in ground 1 to 11 hereof.
13.

For the further reasons shown in appellant's
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separate petition for modification of this court's opinion
and judgment herein.
0. H. MATTHEWS,
P. G. ELLIS,
Attorneys for Appellant.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON REHEARING
GROUND 1
In view of Ground 2 hereof we might dispense with
Ground 1 but for a duty we owe the court and the additional
light thrown on ground 2 et seq.
The Court's opinion treats Benson v. Rozelle as if
overruled by Gibbs v. District Court. We submit that such
is not the effect of the Gibbs case, but this Court distinguished the Benson-Rozelle case and left both cases
standing, each within its distinctive field. Had the two
cases been deemed so much alike in fact or principle as to
justify but one rule it would have been easy for this Court
to have said so and to have overruled Benson v. Rozelle
as a precedent in future cases. Whatever individual lawyers
may think as to the distinction taken between the two cases
is of no importance, in practice, since it is the prerogative
of this Court to draw distinctions and declare the law in
its own wisdom and discretion. It did this in the Gibbs
case and told the bar and public that both cases are correct,
each within its own field, and that both cases might be cited
in future. This present appeal presents a complaint that
is on all-fours with that in the Benson--Rozelle case, almost
word for word in allegation and prayer for relief. Hence
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our brief on appeal was prepared in reliance on that case.
Is it proper then to defeat that reliance and to interpose
the Gibbs case which this Court declared in its opinion
therein to rest upon distinguishable grounds from the Benson-Rozelle case?
"The Supreme Court is bound by its former deci·sions. Its former decisions are until overruled or
modified binding upon the Supreme Court."
Stookey v. Green, 178 Pac. 586 (Utah) ;
"Thos·e who transact business in the State have
a right to rely upon the law as declared by the
Supreme Court."
Passow· v. Emery•, 106 Pac. 935 (Utah).
And, as this Court observed on another occasion, it
is more important that the law be settled than how it is
settled. The public is entitled to know with certainty.
Fixity is more important than abstractions. The suspense
of imperfect opinion is devastating. If the law on any subject is subject to change any day without notice, how are
clients to be safely advised. It costs money, a lot of it, to
litigate, and clients should not be invited to embark if the
landmarks are liable to disappear before or when the case
is decided.
In so speaking,. we yield to no one in the respect
and affection in which we hold our Supreme Court. The
bench and bar are not antagonists but companions and fellow workers in the cause of applied justice. We of the bar
can render our best service to the Court by cordial cooperation and ·clear and free exchange of views.
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In Congress they have invented a Committee on Rules,
which is a sort of flying squadron, empowered at any
moment to get into action and improvise a rule of procedure
that will cut the dykes of existing rules and turn the tide
of legislation in any desired direction. That device may
have its usefulness in formulating legislation, but nothing
similar has heretofore been deemed appropriate in judicial
procedure. This Court stands ready at all times to invalidate
any statute that is ex post facto in its operation as unconstitutional. Should it do less when one of its own decis~ions
has an ex post facto operation and effect?
Our case law is now so colossal that we do not believe
it humanly possible for the members of this Court or any
Court, to always have in mind the implications of all its
former decisions, not to mention those of the other states
and federal which are constantly being cited. It is entitled
therefore to the vigilance of counsel to aid it in steering a
true compass course; else the case law may drift into
confusion.
One consequence of the present opinion is that it
goes far to undermine not merely the Benson-Rozelle case
but the far more important decision of this Court in Evans
v. Evans, 98 Utah, 189; 98 Pac. 2d, 703. The decision in
that case was an unusually careful and well-considered
opinion by Judge Wolfe, expounding the privacy and property rights of the citizen in his books and records and their
constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and
seizures. The law of that case will fall largely into discard
if in this case Newman's books and records are liable to be
ordered to be produced en masse before a referee for all
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and sundry, as is purported to be done by the orders of
reference in this case (rec. p. 74-75, 78-79), without any
previous showing and judicial determination of a right
thereto. This Court, in its decision in the Benson-Rozelle
case may well have had these constitutional considerations
in mind and decided the case in deference thereto, while in
the Gibbs case it did not. Evans v. Evans was decided by
this Court after both those cases, but the constitutional immunity expounded thereby preexisted both those cases.
Benson v. Rozelle required the averment of partnership
(k~ystone to the right of inspection of alleged partnership
books and records-) to be judicially determined, before the
defendant could be deprived of his property rights in the
privacy of his books and records and in the information
they contain. The Gibbs case and the present case do not
extend that protection or immunity, but order production
en masse long prior to any attempted adjudication of the
question of partnership and of the right to inspection.
Yet, this Court pointed out in Evans v. Evans, irreparable
harm and injury inay occur before the error could be corrected by appeal after final judgment.
In the Gibbs case this Court say that the district court
it not required by statute to determine matters in bar of
an accounting before taking the account (which involves
production of books and papers). Perhaps not. But the
constitutions, state and national, which are higher than
any statute, forbids an order for mass production of books
and papers, such as we have here, without any previous
showing of the plaintiff's right thereto and without the
safeguards prescribed by this Court in Evatns v. Evans,
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supra. And there is no disc1·etion of procedure that can
justify letting down the bars in this respect. The rule in
Benson v. Rozelle extends this protection against unreasonable search and seizure until the right is first adjudicated.
As this Court observed in Evans v. Evans, business books
and records often contain information of the utmost concern to the owner, as well as to the inquisitive eyes of
competitors, or their agents or accomplices. Undue exposure thereof may spell destruction and ruin. The rule
in the Gibbs case appears to let down the bars because no
stat'ute compels discretion. The rule in Benson-Rozelle
averts harm from invasion of constitutional rights before
it is done, by appeal with certiorari in aid. The rule in
the Gibbs case compels resort to the writ of prohibition
to avert the harm before it happens. And this Court may
soon be overrun by petitions for prohibition from all over
the state from litigants desiring to resist attempted piracy
of their books and papers. For if, upon final decree it be
adjudged that no partnership existed, the harm will already have been done without redress.
The writer of this brief was not the trial attorney.
From a close reading of this record he concludes that this
harm has. not yet occurred in this case, but that it n1ay be
if the case ever reaches the accounting stage, or the stage
at which a valid order is asked for mass production of
books and papers of the defendant in order to proceed
with the accounting without the showing required by this
Court in Evans v. Evans. We believe that whatever investigations were made by the referee in this case were made
upon books and records submitted by appellees alone, and
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not upon appellant's books. See our opening brief pp. 93-97.
Which is all the more reason why an attempted exparte
adjudication of appellant's rights from unsworn books or
records kept or produced by others, without opportunity
for inspection or cross-examination, should not stand. Mere
written hears~ay.
GROUND 2

This injury done to the case law is without balancing
consideration in arriving at a decision of this case under
the rule in the Gibbs case. The procedure authorized by
the Gibbs· case as discretionary with the trial court cannot
save the judgment appealed from reversal. Grant that it
was within discretion for the trial court to combine the
issues in bar of accounting, and the issues in accounting,
all in one trial. What is the consequence? The record shows
that the trial court did choose to proceed in the manner
prescribed by the rule in the Benson-Rozelle case by trying
the issues in bar of accounting first. Whether it pursued
this course in deference to this court's ruling in Benson v.
Rozelle, or as a matter of discretion, does not appear. Nor
is it material, since this Court recognizes its right to so
proceed in its discretion, even if not obliged to do so by
jurisdictional considerations, and it will not review that discretion. In so doing, the trial court conducted a preliminary
trial on the question of partnership, or no, ruled out all
evidence in accounting, and sustained objections from both
sides to questions by the other side seeming to call for
matters in accounting. See our opening brief pp. 11-13
with record page citations.
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No error is assigned, and no one is here complaining,
that the trial court proceeded thus. All that this appellant
need ask, if the rule in the Gibbs case is applied in this
one, is that the trial court, having chosen its plan of procedure, do not depart therefrom at any stage of the trial
to appellant's injury and disadvantage. That is, it should
not in trying first the issue of partnership and liability
to account and rejecting all evidence of either side as to
matters in accounting, upon reaching its decision of the
first matter, suddenly switch over to the opposite theory
that all matters both in bar and in accounting are determinable in one trial and by one set of findings of fact, without ever hearing any evidence at all upon the accounting
issues of the case. And we mean that the trial court did
exactly that. And this Court will see it as we go along, or
if it reads this record closely.
At the close of the preliminary trial on April 6, 1943
the trial court announced its decision that the several jobs
were joint ventures. This Court in its opinion holds, upon
the basis of Wells v. Porter, 205 Cal. 776, 272 Pac. 1039
that if the parties were joint adventurers they could not
have been partners or employer-employees. If so, that
ought to end this case in view that the plaintiffs alleged
partnership, and the court found joint ventures, and the
judgment should be reversed for the variance. But we are
not dependent upon that issue alone for our right to a
reversal in this case. Upon deciding that the jobs were
joint ventures the trial court desired plaintiffs' counsel
to prepare interlocutory findings and decree determining
their right to an accounting, and inviting counsel to agree
upon a referee to take the accounting. (rec. 303-308.)
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Had the counsel complied and the court signed and filed
such findings and decree, this appellant could have come
at once to this court by appeal if the rule in Benson v.
Rozelle was still the law. If not, he might still have resorted to certiorari or prohibition as the case might be.
But counsel did not so comply. At what point of time
counsel began to mediate a change of tactics does not appear.
The record merely shows that about three weeks later on
April 24th, 1943 an order was signed and filed appointing
Mr. Dansie as referee (rec. p.

7~76)

and an amended order

of reference on April 28, 1943 (rec. p. 78-79), without any
findings of fact or decree to account having been signed,
filed or entered, and without showing of their right to
inspection of books and records.
Our opponent will say, of course, that the case having
been sent to a referee, the right and opportunity to offer
any evidence desired as to matters in accounting was preserved. We dispute that contention and say that no such
opportunity was ever given to offer evidence in accounting
before either the referee or the court. Not only the referee's
report but the record of which it is a part shows this fact
affirmatively ·and upon the face thereof. Wherefore the
contention of opportunity afforded to present evidence and
to make objections before the referee is unsupported by the
record. And wherefore also the so-called referee report is
null and void on its face. We speak of this more fully
under Grounds 4 to 6 hereof.
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GROUND 3

We object to the holding in the court's opinion that
the trial court's own findings of fact at the end of the
entire trial in June 1943 was complete and responsive to
each and all of the issues so as to sustain the judgment for
$19,451.03 against appellant. And even if so, there was
no evidence whatever to sustain such findings. We must
remind that the issues were dual (1) as to partnership,
and (2) as to evidence of debits and credits in accounting
with balance struck. In view that there was never any
evidence in accounting taken before the Court, how can
it be said that the findings of fact embrace a decision or
finding of fact upon those issues? A finding of fact upon
no evidence at all within the accounting issues surely can
not be treated as a valid adjudication of those facts or
issues. The very fact that a referee was appointed and
ordered to take an account upon evidence to be presented
before him by the parties, shows that the court never undertook to hear evidence in that field on the basis of which
it could possibly make findings of its own. The trial court
could not make a finding of fact upon evidence which it
never heard, and from testimony of witnesses whom it has
never seen. If the referee conducted a trial, heard testimony
and made findings, and had returned both findings and
evidence into court; then the trial court would be in position
to review the referee's findings in his report on the same
evidence that the referee heard, and amend, add to, or set
the same aside upon objections filed by counsel on either
.side. Unless such evidence was reported into court in some
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form by the referee, the trial court could neither modify
the referee's findings nor substitute findings of its own.
Let this distinction be borne in mind, viz : That a
referee's report is not, in its very nature, cannot be, evidence of a fact. If valid at all, it is as an adjudication of
facts by a judicial tribunal. It is the summary and adjudicated result of evidence produced prior thereto before
the referee,-not the evidence itself. Just as the district
court's own findings of fact constitute adjudication, not
evidence. The referee's report or findings of fact, when
filed in court have precisely the same function as do the
trial court's own findings of fact when first filed in court.
That is, they are tentative only, and subject to revision
or amendment. Under Code 104-26~2. the court may on
motion add to or modify its own findings of fact to conform them to the issues and evidence adduced at the trial.
Under 104-27-6 the court may do the same thing with respect to the referee's findings of fact in his report when
returned and filed in court. But, of course, he can not
alter, set aside or modify a referee's findings in his report
to make same conform to the evidence taken before the
referee, unless that evidence has been preserved and returned into court by the referee with his findings of fact.
In such case the trial court can only review the referee's
findings to make them conform to the issues in the pleadings,
at best.
In this case, no evidence before the referee was certified into court by bill of exceptions or otherwise. Hence
it was not attempted to be modified or amended in any way
because of non-conformity with evidence taken before the
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referee. And it could not be lawfully changed or amended
by evidence de novo before the district court. We apprehend that it is an unheard of thing in court procedure for a
party dissatisfied with a jury verdict, or a court or referee's
findings of fact, to attempt to assail the same by evidence
de novo of the facts, either to reduce or increase the amount
of the money recovery. His remedy is to either (1) move
for a new trial, or (2) to show by the record of evidence
already taken before the court that the amount of recovery
in the court's findings should be increased or reduced. Or
if it is a referee's finding, that the evidence before the
referees requires such alteration. What would this Court
think of an attempt by a litigant to offer evidence de novo
either in the Supreme Court, or in the District Court, to
add to, alter or modify the amount of a money recovery
as fixed by the verdict or findings of fact in a case?
Ground 3 of our objections herein should be sustained.
GROUNDS 4, 5 and 6

The referee's report was a nullity upon its face. It
was neither evidence nor an adjudication of facts by a
lawful tribunal acting within the scope of statutory authority. By statute a court may appoint a referee to sit as a
court to hear evidence under oath, make findings of fact,
and report the same with conclusions of law stated separately. Code 104-27-6. In an accounting case where the
items of account are numerous and complex it is appropriate that the court appoint a competent accountant, but
his duties remain the same, i.e., that he proceed judicially
to conduct a public trial, and with due process of lav,r.
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This requires notice and opportunity to be heard and to produce witnesses and cross-examine those opposed.
Code section 104-27-6 is a legislative precaution to
insure due process of law in trials before referees. It requires a referee to set a date for trial, notify the parties
of the time and place at least ten days ahead, and enable
them to prepare for trial. A referee is bound to obey this
statute just as much as is the district court itself, in setting
its cases for trial. A failure to comply deprives a litigant
of due process and voids the proceedings.
Sec. 104-27-7 authoriz·es the referee to administer
oaths to the witnesses at the trial. Sec. 104-39-8 authorizes
a referee to sign and settle a bill of exceptions of the evidence before him and as well after as before he ceases to
be such referee. Sec. 104-54-5 provides that the rules of
evidence before a referee are the same as those in court
trials. In Reever v. White, 8 Utah, 188, 30 Pac. 685 our
Supreme Court held that a referee has power to grant a
nonsuit for insufficient evidence.
The present statute (104-27-6) traces back to territorial days. Utah Rev. Stat. 1888, sees. 3388-3390 contained all the essentials of the present statute, notwithstanding changes in phraseology. Under the earlier statute
the practice was : 1. The referee tried the issues;

2. The referee reported his findings of fact and conclusions;
3. The parties filed any desired exceptions thereto
in the trial court.
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4. The court ruled on the exceptions and rendered
judgment on the referee's findings.
5. The party alleging error filed his motion for new
trial.
6. The trial court ruled on motion for new trial.
7. Appeal to the Supreme Court.

Hanks v. Matthews, 8 Utah, 181; 30 Pac. 504.
Now where a trial court has itself tried the case and
heard the witnesses, he can remember the evidence and
rule on a motion for a new trial on ground of no evidence
or insufficient evidence. But where the evidence was produced before a referee, the trial court cannot do this unless
the evidence before the referee has. been preserved and
reported back by the referee with his findings of fact and
conclusions of law. In the absence thereof, the trial court
must do what the Supreme Court does when a case comes
up without a bill of exceptions,-i.e., presume that the
evidence if preserved would support the findings. This,
however, assumes that the referee has. proceeded lawfully,
given due notice, conducted a trial in the presence of the
parties as required by the due process clause and by the
state statute.
The failure of the referee to set a time for trial and
give the parties. notice of the time and place, or to conduct
any public trial appears affirmatively by recitals upon its
face and by his testimony on the face of the record of which
his report is a part. Our statements of fact from the record
and record page citations in this respect are set forth in
our opening brief (rec. pp. 77 to 98), so we need not repeat.
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"The constitutional guaranty of due process
applies to both civil and criminal procedure, as well
as to statutes regulating the same. This includes the
right to notice and hearing before a competent tribunal."
16 Corp. Jur. Seg., page 1221, sec. 611 and citatations.
"Questions of due process may be directed
against the course and manner of judicial proceedings."
Id., p. 1221, sec. 611, note 57 and cases.
Due process includes the right to notice, not
only with respect to the original summons and service thereof to bring defendant into court to answer,-

Nais'bitt v. Herricks, 2'90 Pac. 950 (Utah).
Riggins v. Dist. Court, 51 Pac. 2d, 645, syl. 37;
(Utah).
-but also with respect to interlocutory orders and
proceedings which affect his rights.
Hilton Bros. Motor Co. v. Dist. Court, 82 Utah,
372; 25 Pac. 2d, 595.
Cox v. Dixie PoW'er' Co., 16 Pac. 2d, 916 (Utah).
Cupit v. Park City Bank, 10 Utah, 294; 37 Pac.
564.
Cupit v. Park City Bank, 11 Utah, 427; 40 Pac.
707.
The Legislature may prescribe what notice shall
be given which shall conform to "due process' requirements by affording an opportunity to be heard.
16 C. J. S. 1256, note 96, citing cases.
12 C. J., 1230, notes 32, 33 etc., and cases.
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This our Legislature has done by section 104-27-6 and
the referee was bound to obey and comply with it before
proceeding to any sort of judicial investigation.
The failure of the trial court itself to give a
defendant notice of the time and place of trial was
held to be a violation of the due process clause of
the constitution, in

Timmerman v. Martin, 176 Sou. (Ala.), 198.
And if so, it was just as much a lack of due process
for the court's referee in this case to neglect the same,
step.
Notice must be given of all essential steps in the
proceedings.

Timmerman v. Martin, supra, and
Utah cases above cited.
16 C. J. S. p. 1222-3, note 64 and cases cited.
To illustrate. In deference to due process requirements,
a defendant is duly summoned into court and the process
returned and filed in court. The record is perfect and shows
jurisdiction of the person and subject matter, and the court
vested with full power and right to proceed and try the
case. But suppose, at the moment the defendant enters the
court room with his witnesses, they are seized by a burley
court bailiff or deputy sheriff and gagged and bound, but
permitted to remain in the court room and to hear every
word that is said by his opponents and the court until the
court has made and filed its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Would that be due process? If so, of what
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value is due process tothe man who is thus deprived of its
benefits? Is he any better off than if he had never been
served with a summons in the case? The record may look
all right on its face, until attacked by evidence alimUde.
If, however, the record is made to show by recitals on its
face that the defendant was thus manhandled and abused,
the judgment and all proceedings would be adjudged void
upon its face.
What difference, in substance, is there between that
.situation and a case where either the· court or its referee,
after defendant answers and the case is ready for trial, slips
'{)ff down the street or in a back alley, or to any unnoticed
time or place, and proceeds to hold a trial, gather up gossip
.and hearsay, and. come back into court and file something
called a referee's report, or a finding of fact by the court
·based upon it?
As we stated, by citation from 16 C. J. S. 1221, sec.
'611, the constitutional guaranty of due process applies
to both civil and criminal procedure alike. In criminal
,cases this. requires that the defendant be personally present
in court at every step in the prosecution. In civil cases it
only requires that the defendant have notice and opportunity to attend and defend. With that qualification, all
that is said in either class of cases is applicable to each
alike. Where due process is not observed the court or
tribunal ioses jurisdiction to proceed, and its acts are void.
'The tribunal loses' its judicial character.
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"When a court having jurisdiction over a prisoner denies him a constitutional right or immunity,
its jurisdiction ceases and its acts are void."
16 C. J. S. sec. 246 page 182 note 78 citing:

Miskimmins v. Shaver, (Wyo.), 58 Pac. 411;
49 L. R. A. 831.
"The court may lose jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant if it lets him go without day."
16 Corp. Jur., page 182, note 75 citing:

State v. Grimes, 141 Pac. 184 (Wash.).
"And, although a court has jurisdiction of a
case, it may be shown that under the facts existing
at the time the court assumed to act were such that
the case was not within the jurisdiction of the court;
and under such circumstances it is, of course, im-proper for the court to proceed further."
15 Corp. Jur. page 824, Courts sec. 135 note 71
citing:

Pickering v. Pickering, 21 N. H. 537;
Ottawa Bank v. Roxborough, 18 Ont. L. 511.
"Where the court having acquired jurisdiction
has lost it, the same rule applies."

Emery v. State, 123 S. W. 133 (Tex.) citing:
State v. Hall, 49 Me., 412;
Hamm v. Wickline, 26 Ohio State, 81.
"There is another line of cases, well known and
unbroken, to the effect that the judgment of the
court is void where the court has gone in excess of
and beyond its jurisdiction."
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Etheridge v. State, 76 Tex. Crim. App. 473 at
page 478; 175 S. W. 702, 86 A. L. R., 1136,
note.
"A judgment is void on collateral attack where
either of the following is lacking, viz:
1. A legal organization of the court or tribunal;

2. Jurisdiction over the subject matter;
3. Jurisdiction over the person;
4. Where one or more of these is lost after it

once existed.
In any such case, the judgment and all rights
and titles founded thereon are void even in the hands
of a bona fide purchaser. The dignity of the court
is of no concern.
Pioneer Land Co. v. Maddux, 42 Pac. 295, 297
(col. 2).
·The referee's report shows on its face that due process
was not accorded. The statute and constitutions were disregarded. These fight back and strike down the offending
record and nullify it. It is a dead and lifeless thing. The
district court has no power to adopt, add to, amend or
modify it. The court does not even know on what evidence,
if any, the referee based its report, save that, knowing
the referee acted unlawfully, he had no judicial capacity to
.act upon any evidence. For his failure to get jurisdiction
of appellant's person by giving him notice of a time and
place for trial, he had no jurisdiction to determine any matter of fact, or to bind him by his attempted adjudication
thereof. All his acts were void.
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"A judgment absolutely void * * * may be
attacked anywhere, directly or collaterally, whenever and wherever it presents itself, and either by
parties or by strangers. It is simply a nullity, and
can be neither a basis nor evidence of any right
whatever."

In re Pusey's Estate, 181 Pac. 648, 6.50.
Fe:rbes v. Hyde, 31 Cal. 342, 348.
In re Christensen, 53 Pac. 1003 (Utah).
Jefferson v. Galla.gher, 150 Pac. 1071, syl. 5.
"A judgment rendered without jurisdiction of
the person is no judgment at all. It is a mere nullity.
It is attended by none of the consequences of a valid
adjudication, nor is it entitled to the respect accorded to one. It can neither affect, impair or create
rights. As to the person in whose favor it professes
to be it places him in no better position than he
occupied before, and gives him no new right. As
to third persons it can be neither a source of title,
nor an impediment in the way of enforcing claims.
It is not necessary to take any steps to have it reversed, vacated or set aside. Whenever it is brought
up against the party he may assail its pretensions
and show its worthlessness. It is supported by no
presumptions and may be impeached in any action,
direct or collateral. It is entirely void and may be
s.hown to be void in a collateral as well as in a direct
proceeding."

Jefferson v. Gallagher, 150 Pac. 1971 (Okla.).
And our Supreme Court declared the law in almost
identical terms, in a case where the trial court lacked
jurisdiction both of the person and subject matter. But
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the lack of jurisdiction of either would have produced the
same result. Thus :
"A judgment pronounced by a tribunal having
no authority to determine the matter in issue is
necessarily and incurably void, and may be shown
to be such in any collateral or other proceeding in
which it may be drawn in question.
"No appeal can be necessary from such a judg-ment. It is of no effect, and parties attempting to·
· execute it are trespassers.. A void judgment is in
legal effect no judgment. From it no rights can be·
acquired. Being worthless in itself it neither binds
nor bars any one. All acts performed under it, and
all claims flowing out of it, are void. The parties,
attempting to enforce it may be responsible as tres-passers. The purchaser at a sale under its authority
finds himself without title and without redress.
"No intendment of law or presumption of fact
can be made in favor of its jurisdiction, whether it be
as to the subject 1'Yll1Atter or the person of the d;efe'Yirdant."
In re Ckristtens·en (Utah), 53 Pac. 1003,

1006~

Concerning such a void judgment it has been held that:A judgment of affirmance thereof by the Supreme Court on appeal would not impart validity to
it, but the judgment of affirmance would itself be
void by reason of the voidness of the judgment appealed from.
Pioneer Land Co.
Chambers

v.

Madd'ux, 42 Pac. 295, 295 ;:

v. Hodges,

23 Tex., 105.

It is not necessary to take any steps to have it
reversed or set aside; but whenever it is brought up
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against a party he may assail its pretensions and
show its worthlessness.

Jefferson v. Galla.gher, 150 Pac. 1071, syl. 5.
Likewise as to other public records of whatever nature. Thus as to tax sales and tax deeds, the Supreme Court
of Utah has only recently held that,"A statement in a tax deed of a fact showing
that it was improperly issued, is fatal to its validity."

Telonis v. Staley, 104 Utah, . . . 106 Pac. 2d,
163 at page 175, quoting with approval from
Price v. Barnhill, 98 Pac. 77 4 (Kan.) ;
Wall v. Kaign, 45 Utah, 244, 144 Pac. 1100.

Ball v. Busch, (Mich.) 31 N. W. 565, 570.
Likewise where the tax record produced in evidence
showed that the assessment roll did not have the County
Auditor's authenticating affidavit thereto attached, the
tax deed and record were held void on their face.

Equitable Life & Casualty Co. v. Schoewe, 144
Pac. 2d, 526, (104 Utah).
GROUND 7

We object to the statement in the opinion about conflicting evidence. In view of what has been said herein it
is manifest that there was no conflict of evidence, insofar
as the accounting procedure is concerned, to warrant the
Court in invoking the rule of decision in Stanley v. Stanley,
97 Utah, 520, 94 Pac. 2d, 46·5. Recourse to that rule must
have been due to some misapprehension.
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We have shown before herein that the District Court
never took any evidence on the accounting feature of the
case, but referred the case to a referee to take evidence
and report. The referee made some inquiries or investigations of an unofficial nature from sundry persons not under
oath, and out of the presence of the parties or their counsel,
except that at times the plaintiffs' attorney, Mr. Callister,
was in some intimacy and abetting the referee in his nonjudicial inquiries. Some two months later the referee's
so-called report was. produced from Mr. Callister's possession during a court session of some sort, where evidence was
being produced, and filed it in the case (rec. p. 316). It
purports to be or to contain findings of fact by the referee.
It contains a number of schedules and tables.
The report is not accompanied by any certified statement or bill of exceptions by the referee setting out the
evidence on which it professes to be based. It shows on its
face that no such evidence, in a judicial sense, was ever
produced, heard or considered. It shows that no trial was.
ever had, or notice given to parties of the time or place
of trial. But had the referee acted with entire regularity
in this respect, he never reported any evidence back to the
court. Hence it could not possibly be determined, either
by the district court or this Court, that there had been a
conflict of evidence before the referee warranting an application of the rule in Stanl£y v. Stanley, 97 Utah, 520 as to
a decision by the Supreme Court upon conflicting evidence.
This Court has no means of knowing, judicially or otherwise, what the evidence was before the referee, hence
whether conflicting or not. It does not know that there was
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any evidence at all. Judicially, and in a legal sense, it is.
bound to know that there was no evidence at all before the
referee, because he was without jurisdiction to sit and hear
evidence without notice to the parties of the time and
place of trial. The referee's report is void upon its face,
hence there can be no presumptions in its favor, as we
have seen by citations herein.
All right, then, where could the conflict of evidence
have occurred on this accounting feature, to which the
opinion refers? As we have stated, and we deem the proposition incontestable, there is no authority of law for the
district court to have taken evidence on its own account in
court, on the basis of which to overthrow the findings of
fact by the referee. If convinced that the referee had
proceeded illegally, so that his findings had no value, it
might perhaps have quashed the report and set it aside,
and proceeded to take evidence de novo covering the whole
field of the accounting, as if the case had not been referred
to a referee. This it did not do. If the referee's report was
null and void on its face, it could not be added to or amended,
not even if it was accompanied by a transcript of evidence
taken ex parte. If it could be adjudged valid, then there is no
authority of law for the district court to take evidence de
novo upon which to add to, vary or modify the findings of
fact by the referee based upon the evidence taken before
him. The remedy would be to move for a new trial if
dissatisfied with the amount found by the referee, which
was $13,386.37.
Neither a jury verdict nor a court finding, or a referee·
finding can be increased in the trial court by new evidence-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28

·before the court. If so, this writer has never heard of it
,during nearly fifty years of practice. And if not, where
·could the conflict of evidence occur, warranting the rule of
·decision in equity cases in Stanley v. Stanley?
On the other hand, should it be contended that the
referee's report being void. on its face, the d~strict court
had the right upon its being filed in court, and its voidness
noted, to have proceeded to hear evidence in accounting as
-if the case had not been referred to the referee. Or, which
is the same thing in effect, treat the referee's report as
·merely advisory and make its own findings of fact. Then
what? The answer is that the district court did not do any
such thing. Nor did either party attempt to try the case
•over again, ignoring the referee's work. The district court's
findings ( rec. p. 83-90) do not on their face purport to
rest upon a trial or evidence de novo. It professes on its
face to rest upon the adjudication of facts by the referee
in his report, if such it can be termed. Several pages of the
tabulated figures in that report are copied bodily into the
court's findings of fact. And the latter recites in paragraphs
2, 3 et seq. that the court "adovts the referee's report in part
,OJnd modifies the same in part." ( rec. p. 84.)
The report being void for want of due process of law
in its preparation, could not be lawfully adopted in who~e
"()r in part. And even were it not void on its face, the district court could not adopt it in part and modify it in part,
in the absence of a transcript of the evidence before the
referee on which to test the correctness of the referee's
findings. And the Court did not take any evidence in
.Court to take the place of what the referee may have
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heard but did not certify into court. As we have stated,
the District Court is without power to take evidence de novo•
in court as a basis on which to judge whether the. referee's
findings were supported by the evidence which the referee·
heard and considered, but did not report back to the court.
If so, will some one please point out the section of our
code or statutes where such statutory authority may be
found. The district court cannot even do that in order to
support its own findings of fact,-not to mention the referee's findings. When facts are once "found" or adjudicated,
that ends the trial and all taking of evidence, until in some
lawful way the findings are vacated and set aside and
a new trial ordered. See Utah decisions under Utah Rev~
Stat. 1933, sees. 104-26-2 and 104-26-3, same sections of
U. A. C. 1943.
This does not mean that we assert the plaintiffs did
not attempt to put in some evidence before and after the,
referee's so-called report was produced and filed in the
district court by Mr. Callister. But we do say that the district court had no authority to receive it for the purpose
of judging or modifying the referee's report. And we
further say that such evidence was not in its nature, character or extent such as could take the place of that on which
the referee attempted to act and make a finding. It did
not attempt to furnish evidence of debits and credits, and
balance, based upon transactions down to Sept. 3, 1942,
upon which the district court could have made findings
of fact, in lieu of those contained in the referee's report,.
yielding a balance of $13,386.37 or any other amount.
What the plaintiffs attorney did attempt to do was.
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to produce evidence of transactions after Sept. 3, 1942
that would enable him to enlarge the balance due from
$13,386.37 found in the referee's report, to $19,451.03
as contained in the final judgment. Not only was this
attempt ultra vires of the district court's powers, as
we have shown, but there was no competent evidence of
facts entitling plaintiffs to recover against appellant the
additional or any other amount, even had the Court authority to consider it. If the Court, or any one, doubts this,
or desires to satisfy himself, we respectfully refer to the
proceedings of the second session of court beginning on
record page 309 and to the end. It is too long to quote
,or condense. Anyone can read and masticate it.
GROUND 8

In this ground we object to the implication or holding
of the court's opinion that appellant by failure to., object
to the referee's report when produced in court and filed by
Mr. Callister, thereby waived his right to question its effect
whether as evidence or as~ a judicial adjudication of the
facts. As a judicial record adjudication of facts, being
void upon its face, it can be objected to at any time or place
on direct or collateral attack. (ante pp. 20-25.) If treated
merely as a piece of evidence (?),it has none of the criteria
of evidence according to any tests in the law books. It is
merely written hearsay reporting what some unknown
and unsworn persons are reputed to have told the author
,of the report out of the presence of the parties or their
counsel. As such, it has no value whether in or out of the
record.
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We further assert that, if treated as evidence, it is
incorrect to assume that any such item or document becomes valid evidence to prove anything claimed for it, by
its proponent, simply because it is not objected to by the
party against whom it is offered. Error does not usually
lie to the mere admission of offered evidence that is claimed
to be incompetent, except in jury trials. In equity trials
the chancellor is presumed to know the rules of evidence
and give to a document only such value and weight as it
on its face is entitled to.
Let us illustrate: Suppose in an action by A against
an insurance company B to recover an annuity payable
to A during the life of C. At the trial A undertakes to
prove that C is still alive by producing C in court. C is
brought in, but it is his dead body with rigor mortis,
death palor, and odor from partial decomposition. B does
not object to the corpse being admitted in evidence. Is B
therefore precluded from contending that C is dead because his cadaver was offered and admitted in evidence
without objection?
At a murder trial, the defendant pleads not guilty and
denies the corpus delicti, claiming that the supposed victim
is yet alive. He produces the victim's corpse with a bullet
hole in his head, and it is admitted without objection from
the State. Is the State precluded thereby from contending
that the man is dead?
We need not rely upon possible but suppositious cases.
We take one now from a case but recently decided by this
Court. In Buhler v. Maddison, 140 Pac. 2d, 933 (to appear
in 104 Utah) the plaintiff sued his employer for personal
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InJuries sustained in his employment, on the ground that
the employer had failed to provide workmen's compensation
insurance. The services and injury occurred in Nevada.
The plaintiff therefore offered in evidence part of the N evada compensation statute similar to the Utah statute, imposing liability for injuries where the employer fails to
provide compensation insurance. The Nevada statute was
admitted in evidence without objection from defendant
employer. But this did not prevent our Utah Supreme Court
from weighing and cons,idering the evidence and rendering
judgment against the plaintiff on the ground that the of-·
fered statute did not make out a case for the plaintiff. Yet
if the rule applied in the opinion at bar had been applied
in that case, the defendant would have been precluded from
objecting to the effect of the Nevada statute by his failure:
to object to its admission in evidence, and this Court must
have given it all the effect claimed for it.
&ores of cases like this, in principle, might be cited~
Thus in cases involving tax titles,, or suits upon void judgments, and the like, it may be to the interest of a party
not to object to the admission in evidence of the tax record,
or the judgment record, knowing full well that it is void
and will so appear upon its face. But that does not estop
him to deny that the record is void, not any more than
would the admission of a corpse in evidence without objection prevent him from saying that the man is dead.
In Equitable Life & Cas. Co. v. Schoewe, 144 Pac. 2d,
526, 105 Utah ... , the tax record produced in evidence:
showed that the tax sale was void because the assessment
roll produced in evidence without objection did not have
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the County Auditor's affidavit attached thereto as required
by law.
The fact is that a plaintiff may sue to cancel a void
tax sale, or a void judgment, for defects appearing upon
its face. It is then to his interest to produce in evidence
the void record to prove his averment that the sale or
judgment is void. It is therefore admitted in evidence "without objection" from him. Is he therefore precluded from
contending that the record is void? Yet the case is no
different from what it would be if the same void record
was offered in evidence by his opponent and admitted without his objection, knowing full well that it would prove
its own voidness and invalidity.
"A statement in a tax deed showing that it was
improperly issued is fatal to its validity."

Price v. Barnhill, 79 Kano 93, 95, 98 Pac. 774
(quoted with approval in Telonis v. Staley 1
106 Pac. 2d, 163, at page 175 (104 Utah 0 0)
Wall v. Kaign, 45 Utah, 244; 144 Pac. 1100.
"The legislature did not intend to say that a
paper shall be held prima facie valid when it carries
upon its face the evidence that shows it was void."

Ball v. Busch, 64 Mich. 336, 31 N. W. 565, 570
(quoted with approval in Telonis v. Staley,
supra, and in Wall v. Kaign, supra).
"Thus, where a tax deed shows by recitals on
its face that the property was sold to the County
at a competative sale, the sale and deed were void.
The law does not authorize such a thing to be done."

Wall v. Kaign, supra.
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And finally, the motion. for a
court full opportunity to weigh
aspects and to consider whether
supported upon the entire record.

new trial gave the trial
the evidence in all its
its judgment could be
( rec. p. 96.)

GROUND 9

This ground comprehends all the foregoing 1 to 8.
GROUNUS 10 and 11

This ground involves a disregard of our statute U.A.C.
1943, Title 69, Chapter 1, which however is discussed in
our separate petition and brief for modification filed herewith, to which reference is made to avoid repetition.
GROUND 12

The Court by its opinion affirmed a judgment for
$19,451.03 without any evidence to support it, and without
any finding of fact by either the court or referee that can
sustain it, or sustain any finding if made. The so-called
finding by the Court depends not upon evidence before the
Court warranting such a judgment as that, but upon a
finding by the referee that is void upon its face. It contains
no presumptions in its favor. It may be resisted at all
times and places whether on direct or collateral attack.
See cases ante p. 20-2'5.
The void referee report, it is claimed, recommends a
judgment against appellant for $13,386.37. The appellees
claiming to be dissatisfied with the amount, sought to increase it by evidence before the court, after the referee's
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void report was returned and filed. The report being void,
could not be added to, modified or amended. If it could
be treated as valid, then appellees should have sought a
remedy by motion to vacate it and grant a new trial, or by
a motion to review it upon the evidence taken before the
referee, if that evidence was preserved by certified transcript or bill of exceptions. There was no authority of law
for the district court to hear evidence to enlarge and supplement the amount found by the referee in his report, no
matter whether the report be valid or void. Not any more
than could the district court hear evidence to enlarge the
recovery in a jury verdict returned into court. There is
neither evidence nor finding of fact to sustain either the
referee's $13,386.37 nor the court's enlargement thereof up
to $19,451.03. The district court exceeded its jurisdiction
in permitting the attempt to so enlarge the recovery, and
.also in including the referee's $13,386.37 in its judgment.
The judgment appealed from should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

,

0. H. MATTHEWS,
P. G. ELLIS,
Attorneys for Appellant.
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